Introduction or background: The terms 'publication bias' and 'reporting bias' describe aspects of a phenomenon by which data from trials are not publicized, and so remain inaccessible. This may generate a false impression about the world; but those facts may have important implications for clinical decisions. Thus, the bias may leave patients worse off than they might be.
the treatment of six consecutive cases of warts with intramuscular injections of sulpharsphenamine. As a result of this communication, I venture to guess that not less than a hundred physicians, perhaps several hundred, injected sulpharsphenamine into patients with warts. Supposing that 99 per cent get negative results, what happens? Each of them gives up the method as a failure and does not say anything more about it, and the treatment remains on record as an undisputed success. Possibly 1 per cent who meet with success will communicate with Dr. Sutton, so that by and by he will have quite an impressive series of cases, comparable with the mercurochrome successes published in a recent number of THE JOURNAL. To practice what I am preaching, let me now report that on November 30, I injected 0.4 Gm. of sulpharsphenamine (Squibb) into the left buttock of E.M.B., a girl, aged 18 , who was at that date complaining of the presence of twenty-four warts distributed mostly over the hands and arms. At the present date, there are twenty-eight warts, and evidence of regressive changes in the original twenty-four has not been seen. 1 The phenomenon that the letter discusses calls attention to an instance of what we would today call reporting bias or publication bias: a phenomenon whereby the results from some trials never make it into the public domain, and a false impression of a treatment's effectiveness is thereby given. Though some have claimed to be unable to find compelling evidence of this phenomenon, 2 others have found that it is real. 3, 4 To whatever extent that it does occur, several sources insist that the non-publication of data is in some sense 'unethical', [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] or that publication of all results is an ethical imperative. 10 What is not so clear is whether and why that would be true. More importantly, if not reporting all the results is so obviously unethical, we might wonder why people don't. What, then, is the moral status of publishing all the results of clinical trials?
To answer that question, I shall spend a little time looking at the nature of the phenomenon, and consider a selection of responses. I hope to be able to show is that there is a genuine problem here, at least formally: that there are reasons both to publish and not to publish all trial results; but that (at least when considered from an ethicist's perspective), it is a problem that to which the desirable response is fairly straightforward.
Why does non-publication matter?
It is not difficult to ascertain why the phenomenon might be important. It is surely desirable to have as good an idea as possible about the effectiveness and safety of drugs and treatments before they are used in the clinic. Presumably, we would want information on promising treatment modalities to be publicized; but there same would apply to information on unpromising ones. By 'information', we may mean the raw data from a trial, or the results that are yielded by the analysis of those data. The moral arguments may alter slightly depending on which we mean when talking about publication, but their general thrust is likely to be similar; I shall pare them as necessary as the paper progresses, but many of the arguments apply to at least some extent to both.
There are four lines of argument at play. The first is perhaps the least obviously an 'ethical' concern in the everyday sense of the word; it relates to the character-the 'ethos'-of scientific research. Ferguson and Heene note that the integrity of science draws on replication and falsifiability 11 ; this sentiment is echoed in a letter to The Lancet from Francoise Baylis and Matthew Herder from 2015. 12 This suggests that we might be able to insist that science that does not accommodate replication and falsification is imperfect science. We might even be able to push things further, making a recognizably Popperian claim that falsifiability is crucial to distinguishing science from non-science, and that, therefore, an experiment that is not replicable or falsifiable may not count as scientific at all, let alone as imperfectly scientific. This would matter for the problem under consideration here, because both replication and falsifiability are undermined when some outcomes remain unpublished.
11 Not publishing data (or, at least, not aspiring to publish them), the argument goes, therefore corrodes the nature of the scientific endeavour, and so violates its 'internal morality'-the set of standards that make an endeavour the endeavour it claims to be. But is not only the 'ethos' of research that suffers; clinical research is supposed to generate further goods, and replication and falsification processes are crucial to that. It seems to follow that anything that undermines this process will be morally problematic on that account as well. This brings us neatly to the second line of argument, which has to do with patient welfare. Non-publication may lead to clinicians making decisions based on skewed information (p. 911). 13, 14 Suppose a medic is persuaded by promising trial reports to opt for new a drug, φ, in favour of the more established α to treat a condition; but suppose also that some significant portion of the trials into φ's effectiveness had shown it to be less effective than α, and that these 'null' outcomes never reached the journals. In that case, our medic will be choosing a suboptimal treatment. 15 Since using φ often means not using α, the patient will, therefore, be worse off than she otherwise might have been, and might also be worse off in absolute terms if her condition gets worse in the meatime. 16 
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) This consideration also raises a concern about justice, an appeal to which provides the third reason why non-publication matters. If unpublished research was looking at a plausible hypothesis, it would not be unreasonable to expect that more than one group would be investigating it; non-publication increases the chance of time and treasure being wasted chasing the same wild goose repeatedly. Thus, the desirability of replication as part of the 'ethos' of science has a mirror image in the desirability of avoiding unnecessary duplication (p. 2). 16 There is another element to the justice argument. Drugs have to be paid for, whether by the taxpayer or the patient. It is straightforwardly unjust to be expected to contribute to the cost of drugs that are known by some to be ineffective, or the ineffectiveness of which is obscured by means of an incomplete publication record (p. 21). 4 An example of this comes from the UK government having paid £424m stockpiling Tamiflu despite the absence of any consensus about its effectiveness 22 ; this is presumably public money that need not have been spent, or that could have been better spent. Furthermore, resources spent on work that languishes in researchers' bottom drawers are resources wasted 6, 23 ; and since medical research is often partially funded by charities, this seems to be particularly worrisome.
(There is an important aside to be made here. In all these cases, users and funders may have been deceived into prescribing or paying for things that cannot provide what they appear to promise. Still, this does not imply that there must be deliberate deceit for any of these arguments to bite. It might be that results are withheld in bad faith; but there are good faith reasons to withhold them, too, and I shall consider them in a moment. That deception occurs does not mean that anyone intends it).
Finally, Dickersin and Chalmers make an argument for publication of data that appeals to the motivations of trial participants: '[p]articipants in clinical research are usually assured that their involvement will contribute to knowledge; but this does not happen if the research is not reported publicly and accessibly' (p. 532). 6 This concern has been echoed in a recent statement by the ICJME:
The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICJME) believes that there is an ethical obligation to responsibly share data generated by interventional clinical trials because participants have put themselves at risk. 24 Tacit in these statements is an appeal to a social contract: participants make sacrifices, and it is owed to them that this sacrifice should be given the greatest possible chance of having an impact. 25 Whether this argument generates anything like an obligation to publish data is uncertain; but there would seem all the same to be at least a reason to consider publication based on respect for patients' motivations. However we approach it, there would seem to be plenty of reasons to think that morality requires that the outcomes of clinical trials be published in some form.
Why aren't results published?
If the moral arguments against non-publication of trial data are so straightforward, why aren't all trial outcomes published? Two kinds of answer to that are possible, one framed as explanation, and the other framed as justification.
One of the most mundane explanations for nonpublication of clinical trial data and results is that experiments that yield apparently uninteresting results-results that are not (or are not held to be) statistically significant-may not even be submitted for publication, on the basis that there is simply nothing to report, or that a null finding does not merit the effort of reporting it. 21, 26 Thus, some reporting bias may creep in before papers' (non-)submission to journals. 27 Importantly, Chan et al. report
having found no evidence that non-positive results are less likely to be published once submitted, 'indicating that investigators do not submit reports of studies with negative results' (p. 259) 26 -although, of course, we may never know whether non-positive results would have been published if they had been submitted for publication. They may not have been: peer-reviewers are often directed to evaluate the novelty of research. 28 Thus, research may vanish on the fallacious assumption that null results make no scientific contribution. This fallacy may explain nonpublication, but if there is an all-else-being-equal moral reason to publish, it will not excuse it. A related reason for results having gone missing is the importance of impact metrics from published papers. In an academic culture in which success is measured by citation rates, there is less incentive to put the work into a paper that is not expected to attract citations (p. 30) 21 -and there is evidence that non-statistically significant results are cited less often (p. 272). 29 At the same time, journals can afford to be selective about which papers they accept, and will themselves have a bias towards eye-catching claims: after all, 'journals… compete for readers' (p. 33). 21 In passing, this would militate against publishing the replication studies that lend credibility to a claim but are obviously secondary to it; and since researchers know this, they would be less likely to carry them out, thereby increasing the chance of a fluke result having a greater importance than it merits. Yet, again, explaining behaviour won't necessarily justify it; and so reviewers and editors may come in for criticism for fostering the kinds of fallacy that inhibit researchers.
Why shouldn't results be published?
If non-publication may sometimes be explicable by a kind of reticence from researchers, the outcome may still be that it leads to clinically suboptimal outcomes. What it does not imply is bad faith. Potentially more worrisome is the possibility that the (commercial) funders of trials deliberately choose to withhold data that are not supportive of a particular product. There is a business reason to do this, and no shortage of examples: Ben Goldacre provides handy lists of instances (passim, but esp. p. 59). 21, 30 Such practices look like actions that can only be performed in bad faith; as we shall see, they need not always be.
There are several available lines of positive argument against publishing everything. One concern is that there can be too much information. Castellani worries explicitly that 'dumping millions of pages of clinical trial information into the public domain' would ultimately undermine public trust in medical research by making it easier for the public to second-guess expert decisions. 31 At the very least, having millions of pages of documentation visible may make no positive difference to the good. A second reason not to publish all results has to do with protecting the rights of the research subjects. It is more or less a given that pains should be taken to protect the identities of people who participate in trials; but the more information about trials is published, the greater the risk that participants will be identified. 31 Indeed, some have suggested that the greater the steps to maintain anonymity, the harder to interpret the data might be 32 ; this generates a problem because there's less justification for sharing data that are less likely to be useful. If we think that participant privacy is a primary concern, it would, therefore, seem permissible or obligatory to withhold certain trial results from publication, especially if they appear not to make a positive contribution to knowledge that might offset the risk of identification.
A third objection to publishing everything rests on an appeal to intellectual property rights and commercial sensitivity. Broadly, the argument is that information from trials is the intellectual property of the researcher or sponsor, and is commercially valuable. This gives researchers a reason to be careful about publication that can be framed in terms of data being legally protected trade secrets (p. 484). 33 One only needs to add a (fairly unremarkable) claim that companies have a moral obligation to do the best by their shareholders to see how a moral argument for not publishing might be generated. 32 On this, Hopkins et al. have noted that data generated in the course of a trial have a history of having been considered the private property of the researcher (p. 17). 34 Though they are considering data-sharing by means other than publication of results, the principle would stand that, if the sponsor of a trial preferred not to publish data that counts as a trade secret, there would be at least a prima facie reason to think that that was their prerogative. (Kesselheim and Mello seem at least vaguely sympathetic to this argument (p. 489).
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) And though an appeal to law is unlikely to settle moral disputes, it does seem reasonable to assume that the legal protections offered to intellectual property offer a possible moral defence of non-publication, since preferring not to break a law that is not gratuitously unjust is generally morally permissible.
It is the fact that there are reasons not to publish all results in principle that turns a phenomenon about publishing-presumably undesirable, but something that can be fixed-into a moral problem: there obtain moral reasons to publish, and competing moral reasons not to. There are legitimate concerns that should be addressed, 24 even if they are in the end overcome. So how compelling are the reasons not to publish? Probably not very.
In defence of publication
Castellani's worry about wide dissemination of information being counterproductive is easily dismissed.
People are wont to second-guess expert decisions anyway, drawing on all kinds of sources; having trial data available cannot make the situation any worse, and it may improve matters. Indeed, having data available to be analysed by outsiders may be desirable, precisely because they may find things that would otherwise be missed. Neither does dissemination create worrying levels of confusion: as Goldacre writes, disputed interpretations are widespread throughout science and medicine, they are normal, and this open debate is how we get closer to the truth.
[… W]e do not silence medical scaremongers in the media by hiding information about trials; if anything, routinely withholding trial results is more likely to undermine public trust. 30 Even fairly minimal data-sharing will bring benefits. Therefore, even if we allow that publishing 'all' results is undesirable, that does not preclude limited publication, or at least a public register of trials. Clinicians and researchers could then perform fairly straightforward searches to see how the trials supporting φ's success stand in relation to the total number of trials. This would make for easier treatment decisions, and help to direct future research; after all, if 20 trials on φ have been registered over a given period but only three published, that tells us something about the justification for using φ. (In an interesting sense, whether φ actually does work is neither here nor there; what matters for treatment decisions is whether the evidence supports it).
Neither should concerns about privacy and confidentiality be insurmountable. Consent for data-sharing can be made explicit; and (as Hopkins et al. note) 'even if explicit consent to share anonymized data has not been requested from patients in ongoing or completed trials, this does not preclude the sharing of anonymized data' (p. 23). 34 While the risk of identification does grow each time trial outcomes are shared, it would not take much to keep it small all the same. Correspondingly, Ben Goldacre states explicitly that the AllTrials campaign is not calling for routine publication of individuals' data anyway. 30 It ought to be possible to give 'broad' results a public airing as a matter of course; granted that some researchers may have a legitimate cause to see detailed results, possibly including subjects' medical histories, a mechanism to allow that could be devised. I shall return to this in a moment. The idea that laws designed to protect intellectual property might militate against data-sharing in some form is also not obviously correct, though there is more of a debate to be had here. Admittedly, we should admit that there are commercial interests that merit acknowledgement: it is not unreasonable to think that there ought to be some non-zero level of protection for clinical trial results. Moreover, even if one thinks that the IP regime ought to be much more liberal, the fact remains that there is such protection as a matter of fact; while breaking unjust laws may be permissible in some cases, whether the current legal situation is sufficiently unjust to warrant that kind of action, and who should carry the burden of performing it, are further questions. We might admire someone who leaks information, and think that it should have been leaked, but still predict that he would and think that he should face legal sanction on the basis that the law is what it is, that the rule of law is a good thing, and that long as the law is valid it ought to be enforced, even if it ought to be changed. In other words, researchers might well be able to say, with some hope of success, that publishing results is desirable all else being equal, but that morally legitimate responsibilities to partners give a reason not to.
Yet the law protecting IP is at root a set of conventions that can, and sometimes should, be changed; the arguments outlined above provide us with good reasons to think that publication is morally desirable, and therefore with a reason to think that the law should accommodate it. Mathias Risse has begun to chip away at the intellectual foundation of the IP argument by raising questions about the very ownability of the products of scientific endeavour (passim but esp. p. 30). 35 If there is anything to his argument, we could use it to discount the worries about commercial sensitivity. Even if Risse's claims are unconvincing, we might still note the difference between data and results. Results might be enforcably ownable insofar as that they are data with which an agent has 'mixed his labour'; but it does not follow from that that intellectual property claims over the raw data would be as strong. And, of course, in both cases, we might be inclined to think that the only reason not to publish negative data and results is based in commercial concerns that are easily trumped by the public interest in their dissemination. After all: it is not as though a firm would want to make a public case for the importance of securing the market in a drug that it knows to be ineffective. Indeed, there is a perceptible movement in the law towards favouring publication. Section 801 of the American 'Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act' 2007 requires that trial data be published online. 36 At the very least, it creates a database that makes it possible to see what research has been undertaken, even if full results are not published. 37 The EU has its own regulations about publicizing research data, 38 and the case law is not unsympathetic to publication-see, for example, the eventual outcome of EMA v AbbVie. 39 In fine, the IP-based arguments against publication are not conclusive, and do not rebut the moral arguments for publication.
What should be done?
American law has required the registration of all trials and results for almost a decade, via clinicaltrials.gov 40 ; the AllTrials campaign has been making the case for a comprehensive register in the UK since 2013. 41 In 2015, the World Health Organisation formally called for 'key outcomes' from all trials to be made public-'key outcomes' here meaning, at minimum, 'participant flow, baseline characteristics, primary and secondary outcome measures, and adverse events including all serious adverse events and important anticipated or unanticipated adverse events'-with the results submitted for publication in a peer-reviewed journal. 10 The potential problem that researchers' good faith may be held hostage by peer-reviewers is answered by the requirement that research only needs to have been submitted, and that the outcomes should be publicly visible even without formal publication. Even so, we might still want to know more about where those results should be publicized, what kind of embargo there might be, what counts as 'serious' and 'important', and how all these considerations should be weighed against legally protected commercial interests. A big set of questions concerns enforceability. Should the moral ideal of publication be handled by law-and if so, how?-or simply by public pressure? It is tempting to say that statutory or quasistatutory means are the only options. However, they may not be all that reliable: a 2011 study found that only 22% of the trials that ought to have been registered under the terms of the American law had been 42 ; later studies indicate that improvement is slow, 43 and that registration rates do not correlate with publication rates, which may be lower 4 (pp. 257-8) 26 (though van Lent et al. are more upbeat 43 ). One possible explanation for this is that large pharmaceutical companies may expect to make so much profit from blockbuster drugs that any legal liabilities incurred from not publicizing all trials can be written off quite straightforwardly 32 if a penalty is ever applied in the first place. 43 There are options to encourage publication of data that stop short of law. The UK's Health Research Authority sets non-statutory standards for transparency (in the form of trial registration) that go beyond what would be required by the European directive. 44 Since the standards are more demanding than the EU's, they are unlikely to change post-Brexit. Non-statutory standards allow for a kind of soft pressure to be put on researchers and sponsors to ensure at least some degree of publicity for trials. As well as indicating who is doing what kind of work, a public registry would potentially shame research sponsors who do not behave according to accepted best practice into being more forthcoming with their data. 9 The system would not be foolproof; one might imagine a devious pharmaceutical developer withholding results from a registered trial to make it look as though an avenue of research is sterile in order to discourage competitors-but then again, that does take an effort of imagination, and it can hardly be worse than the situation as it stands. Clearly, researchers are the focus of these policies. However, some have suggested that the moral responsibilities can and should be spread more widely. Drazen et al. suggest interestingly that '[p]eople interested in participating in trials should consider only studies whose sponsors have fully registered them in an appropriate public database and agreed to publish their results.' 37 This may be too demanding to be a requirement-the layman may not know about how reporting works. Moreover, while someone participating in research may feel resentment if that participation is nixed, it doesn't follow that she has a duty to ensure that data are published. Thus, there does seem to be an argumentative gap between a virtuous motivation to participate in research and any kind of responsibility for what happens to that research. It is a gap that might be closed; but it does have to be closed before this suggestion is wholly compelling.
There is a more plausible role to be played by others involved in the research process. As far back as 1995, Pearn was suggesting that the ethics committees that scrutinize research could demand publication of results as a condition of allowing the research to go ahead in the first place, 45 and this is reflected in the HRA's standards. 44 Yet while ethics committees may have some such responsibility, and while-as Begum and Kolstoe have suggested 46 they may have the capacity to do something about monitoring publication, how publication might be 'enforced' is another matter.
12 This is not least because, by the time researchers decide whether or not to submit a paper, the research has been done and cannot be undone. Moreover, peer-reviewers may reject a paper for all kinds of reason-Glasziou et al. note that research reports may be so badly written that they are unusable (p. 268), 29 and an ethics committee cannot realistically be expected to monitor that. Hence demands for publication would have to be backed up by some means to publicize research outcomes outside of journals while maintaining their quality. Nevertheless, it is likely that trial registration might be all that could be reasonably required with any kind of enforceability. Proposed trials could be registered provisionally on an accessible database even before being seen by ethics committees; registration would, therefore, become a prerequisite of research going ahead at all. 47 Since all research on humans is ethics committee approved, and since papers are presumably written with the intention of publication, all trials would, therefore, be visible even if they don't yield any data that could be submitted to journals. Some means of publicizing results that don't make it to the journals would remain as a further aspiration. Journal editors may have a complementary role: they could require that data be shared as a condition of publication. 24 Glasziou et al. address the role of publishers head on, noting that
[n]either the profit motive of commercial research nor the academic reward system of non-commercial research encourage clear, correct, and complete reporting and access to materials, methods, and data of the research before adding more optimistically that '[t]his situation can be changed' (pp. 273-4). 29 In a similar vein, Chan et al. are surely correct to indicate that any solution to the problem of incomplete reporting must involve the cooperation of researchers, funders, editors and regulators (pp. 261-2). 26 If the problem is systematic, so must be any solution.
There is much more to be said for this kind of approach to the problem than would be inferred from a motion passed by the BMA in 2013, which asserted that selective non-publication of unflattering trial data is research misconduct and […] registered medical practitioners who are believed to have been involved in such conduct should have their fitness-to-practise assessed by the GMC. 48 Asserting that something is misconduct does not make it so; and as we have seen, there are at least prima facie reasons to withhold trial data that do not indicate unfitness to practise. These reasons are what make the phenomenon a problem. Publishing all results can be good public relations for 'big pharma', too, so a sense of honour might be relevant 16, 32 ; and we might look to the insurance industry's self-denying ordinance concerning genetic data to see how large companies' sometimes doing what others would have the law make them do means that the law doesn't make them do it. That is: the commercial sector may come up with datapublicising protocols of its own to anticipate legislators' imposing them. On the other hand, we would want also to ensure that there is more to these protocols than public relations (PR): virtue may be good PR, but good PR is not the same as virtue.
In this light, it is worth pointing out that, under the terms of the PhARMA/EFPIA statement, it is up to outsiders to initiate a request for information, which includes a rationale for the request. This request is then assessed by a review board put together by the company of which the request is made. Finally, [c] ompanies will evaluate, among other things, whether the research proposed has a legitimate scientific or medical purpose, including whether there is any potential conflict of interest between the data requestor and the company or competitive use of the data. In the latter case, it may be assumed that the data requestor may intend to use the company's patient-level data or other information to help gain approval of a potentially competing medicine. While companies may enter into agreements to co-develop medical products, these data sharing Principles are not intended to allow free-riding or degradation of incentives for companies to invest in biomedical research. Accordingly, it would be appropriate for companies to refuse to share proprietary information with their competitors. 49 Arguably, this creates a conflict of interest in its own right, since the gatekeepers to research data would be those who are most likely to lose out from data-sharing (assuming for the moment that there are losses to be made). On top of that, by making data-sharing subject to considerations about commercial interests, the statement might be held to miss the point that campaigners for more openness about trials have been making; besides, it may be in everyone's commercial interests to share data, since that avoids unnecessary duplication of experiments. 7, 50 Finally, there is little guidance on what a 'legitimate scientific or medical purpose' is. It seems reasonable to think that statements such as this may be little more than PR in the absence of stronger regulations, whatever their provenance. Avoiding these problems while retaining some kind of control of information need not be such a hard task; it is easy enough to imagine a system of accreditation, which would allow researchers at a signed-up institution (whether commercial or educational) to access full information by default. This would work in parallel to a system like the one Goldacre proposes. Exactly how the details of publication or registration might work is beyond the scope of this paper. It is enough to say here that the first-order question of whether as much information from trials as possible should be published in some form is fairly easily settled in the affirmative, on the understanding that publishing all results would be the ideal. The remaining second-order question about the best policy to bring this about should not distract us. There are moral reasons not to publish all clinical trial results; but they are easily overcome by the moral reasons to publish.
Incidentally, I became aware of the JAMA letter with which I began this survey when an image of it was posted to Facebook by one of its author's descendants, whom I happen vaguely to know. It got over 130 likes, compared to only two citations detected by Google Scholar. What this says about the best way to publicize research, I am not sure.
